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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY of
REDDING PENNSYLVANIA and
LARRY RICHARDS SILVER, Administrator of the Estate of LYNN
RICHARDS SILVER, deceased,

)
)
)
)

)

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
EAGLE STAR INSURANCE COMPANY,
LTD.,
Defendant and Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
14800

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether the deceased pilot, Lynn Richards Silver, was an
omnibus insured under the Aircraft Hull
of Eagle Star Insurance Company.

& Liability

Policy

If Eagle Star Insurance

Company's policy does not provide primary coverage, there is no
dispute but that American Casualty's Umbrella Excess Third Party
Liability Policy would provide coverage to Lynn Richards Silver,
less a $10,000 retained limit (deductible).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon stipulated facts, both parties filed motions for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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summary judgment and the trial court entered j~dgment in favor
of respondents American Casualty Company and The Estate of Lynn
Richards Silver.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment entered
by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relevant to the issues of this case are not
in dispute and respondents accept appellant's statement thereof
with the following additions and corrections:
a)

American Casualty's umbrella policy provides that

it will indemnify the insured for loss in excess of the total
applicable limits of the underlying insurance stated in the
schedule, in excess of the insured's retained limit.

The

schedule of underlying insurance specifically lists coverage
for "aircraft liability" through the underlying insurer, Eagle
Star Insurance Company, in the sum of $1,000,000.00.
b)

Eagle Star's aircraft policy was written on the

specific aircraft which crashed and gave rise to the claims
which have been filed against the Estate of the deceased pilot,
Lynn Richards Silver.
c)

When the aircraft was first acquired, there was

some discussion of having C. W. Silver Company pay "remuneration
to the Sileo Corporation for its use, in addition to its maintB
- 2-
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ance and operation expenses.
p. 31-32).

(Deposition of Roy R. Silver,

However, such a plan was never put into effect

(Deposition of Roy R. Silver, p. 36, 42-43, & SO) and there is
no record of any remuneration having been paid to Sileo Corporation for use of the aircraft on the fatal trip (Deposition of
Roy R. Silver, p. 43).
d)

It is not admitted that the aircraft in question

was never used for the business travel of Sileo Corporation.
Mr. Larry R. Silver seemed to remember that the aircraft was
used at least on one occasion by Sileo Corporation to take some
people to Bear Lake to look at some property that Sileo Corporation was interested in buying (Deposition of Larry R. Silver,
p.

34).

ARGUMENT
The only real issue in this case is
"remuneration"?

What constitutes

If Sileo Corporation, the owner of the aircraft

received remuneration for the flight in question, then the deceased pilot was not insured under the appellant's policy; if
it did not, then he was insured under appellant's policy.
POINT I
PAYMENT OF OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE EXPENSES DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REMUNERATION
WITHIN THE MEANING OF DEFENDA.~T'S POLICY
It should be noted that this is ~ an action by Sileo
Corporation against c. W. Silver Company to determine whether or
not the former wo11ld have been entitled to remuneration from the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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latter for the use of its aircraft, but it is an action by an
excess insurance carrier and its insured, which has a personal
liability exposure in the amount of its retained limit of
$10,000.00, against the primary insurance carrier to determine
the validity of the latter's denial of coverage to the insured
on the basis that the aircraft in question was being operated
at the time of the accident under an agreement providing for
"remuneration" for the use of the aircraft.
Also, it should be noted that "remuneration" is not
defined by defendant's policy and, therefore, the term should
be construed consistent with its general meaning and as defined
by legal authorities dealing with the term in similar actions.
Webster' t New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged.
Second Edition, defines remuneration as:
"l.

2.

a remunerating; the act of paying an
equivalent for services, loss, or
sacrifices.
the equivalent given for services,
loss, or sufferings; that which
remunerates; reward; pay; recompense;
compensation."

and Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines remuneration
as "Reward; recompense; salary."
The following authorities have considered the questi~
of whether remuneration means reimbursement for expenses, or
only compensation over and above expenses.
In Kaus v .. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 299
N.W. 415 (Iowa 1941), it was held that the amounts collected by
taxicab drivers over and above the cost of gasoline and a $3.00
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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d.

per 12 hour period charge made by the cab company for use of the
taxicabs was "remuneration" to the drivers.

In this regard the

court stated:
Remuneration of an employee may consist of the
difference between the price which he pays his
employer for goods and the price at which he
sells them, a percentage of the sale price of
goods sold by the employee to customers and
collected by him from them, and various other
methods of collecting compensation from customers
rather than directly from the employer. (Auth.
cited.) The earnings of the drivers over and
above the $3 and cost of the gasoline constitute
the remuneration or wages for their services and
it is not necessary that they be paid directly
by appellee.
In overruling a Public Service Commission order denying
a petition to challenge the rates of a railway company, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Anchor Coal Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 15 S.E.Zd 406, gave the following
guideline to the Commission:
Remuneration should include a fair profit on
the performance of any service, and compensation
for any service should also include such profit,
although, strictly speaking, it may have a narrower meaning.
Also, although not specifically differentiating between
expenses and profits, the following authorities indicate profit
for services rendered is an essential element of the term.
"Wages" is defined as a compensation given to a
hired person for his or her services; that for
which one labors; stipulated payment for services
performed.

The word is synonymous with "hire,"

"reward," "stipend," "salary," "compensation,"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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"remuneration".

Bevard v. Ford, 83 Mo.App. 498, 501.

(Emphasis added).
"Remuneration" is generally defined as a payment
for services performed.

Warner Co. v. Unemployment

Compensation Bd. of Review, 153 A.2d 906, 911.
Where services expended by laid-off employee on
his family's farm during period of layoff, might
result in future profits to him, such prospective
profits were "remuneration".

Muchant v. Unemployment

Compensation Bd. of Review, 103 A.2d 438, 440.
Money received by drivers of cabs owned by cab
company was "remuneration" within wages definition
of unemployment insurance law even though drivers
were paid by customers and not by cab company.
Blue Bird Cab Co. v. Maryland Dept. of Employment
Sec., 248 A.2d 331, 334.
In the instant case, Sileo Corporation received no
remuneration from C. W. Silver Company since the latter merely
paid the expenses of maintaining and operating the aircraft.
Sileo Corpora ti on received no profit from C. W. Silver Company's
use of the aircraft; and, specifically, received no payment froo
C. W. Silver Company for its use of the aircraft in connection
with the fatal flight.
Appellant relies on the case of Melton v. Ranger
-6-
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Insurance Co., 515 S.W.Zd 371, (Texas 1974) as supportive of
its position.

In that case, the insurance policy in question

specifically exclu.:led from a definition of insured, "Any person
operating the aircraft under the terms of any rental agreement
or training program which provides any remuneration to the
named insured for the use of said aircraft."

In that case the

insured had executed an express rental agreement for profit
from Nelton.

The court at page 372 stated:

The facts in this case are undisputed.
On May 2, 1969, Donald S. Melton entered into
an aircraft rental agreement with the St. Louis
Flying Service, Inc., whereby Melton for a fee
payable to lessor, rented a Piper Cherokee aircraft from St. Louis Flying Service, Inc. Later
that day this aircraft ran out of gas and crashed,
fatally injuring the pilot, Melton and 6 passengers.
The court later stated at page 372 and 373:
It was undisputed that at the time the
involved crashed it was being operated
t at rovided a remuneration to t e name insured,
St. Louis Flying Service, Inc. Emp asis a
That case is clearly distinguishable by its undisputed facts,
to wit:
made.

That an express rental agreement for remuneration was
So also are the cases of Jahrman v. Valley Air Park, Inc.,

333 So.2d 712 (La.App. 1976) and Buestad v. Ranger Insurance Co.,
551 P. 2d 1033 (Wash.App. 1976) cited by appellant.

In these

cases rental agreements for profit were clearly in effect.
Respondent agrees that the "purpose of use" provisions
of a policy should not be used to expand the omnibus insured
clause; but it is hoped, and assumed, that the drafters of
insurance policies in general, and Eagle Star's policy in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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particular, would intend the two provisions to be consistent
with each other.

In that light, it is interesting to note

that appellant's policy, under DEFINITIONS, paragraph VII,
defines "Purpose of Use" as follows:
(A)
Pleasure and Business.
'The term Pleasure
and Business' wherever used in this Policy is
defined as personal, pleasure, family and business
uses excluding any operation for which a charge is
made.
(Emphasis added).

Just as the courts have held that "remuneration" requires a profit or profit motive, so have they held the term
"charge" requires a profit or profit motive.

The Oregon Supreme

Court in Cammack v. Avemco Insurance Company, SOS P.Zd 348
(Oregon 1973), held that the payment of flight expenses for an
airplane was not "any operation for which a charge is made"
within a policy which excluded the same from coverage.

In

Cammack, the plaintiff's policy provided coverage for the use
of the plane for business and pleasure but excluded "any opera·
tion for which a charge is made," just as in the case at bar.
The plaintiff permitted his uncle and cousin to fly the plane
for $10.00 per flying hour.

The court stated that the plain-

tiff "regarded the $10.00 per hour as helping defray the
immediate costs of flying the airplane."

The direct operating

cost of using this plane was $ 7. 25 per hour, including gasoline.
In addition no "tie-down" fee was charged the owner of the plane,
but this was taken care of by the uncle who owned the airstrip.
It was the uncle's friend, Rutledge, who was flying the plane
when it crashed.

And just as in the case at bar where Eagle

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Star Insurance Company is attempting to avoid coverage by
straining construction of their word "remuneration", the defendant insurance company in Cammack, unsuccessfully attempted to
avoid coverage by straining interpretation of the word "charge".
The court found that the $10.00 per hour paid for the
plane's use as well as the free storage of the plane was merely
a "payment of expenses in a noncommercial context, and we agree
with the trial court that Rutledge's use was not any operation
for which a charge is made."
In the present case, C. W. Silver Company paid only for
the maintenance and operational expenses of the aircraft which
was owned by its sister corporation, Sileo

Corporatio~.

And

although an hourly rental rate had been discussed, it is clear
from the depositions that such a plan was never put into effect.
No profit above expenses was ever realized by Sileo Corporation
for allowing C. W. Silver Company to use the plane.
the Cammack case is directly on point.

Therefore,

A payment of expenses

was not "an operation for which a charge is made".

And, similar-

ly, a payment of expenses only is not "remuneration".
The Oregon court further stated at page 350:
This exclusionary clause appears similar to the
exclusionary clause in automibile coverage which
provides that the insurance does not apply 'while
the owned automobile is rented or leased to others'.
In Christianson v. State Farm Auto Insurance 52
Hawaii 80 91 470 P.Zd 521, 527 (1970)the court
interpret~d this clause, "On balance we think that
the language of the policy ex~ludes covera¥e on~y
where a rental is commercial 1n nature. V1sual1zing a spectrum between simple permissive use (which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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clearly is covered under the policy), and commercial
rent~l for a profit (which clearly is excluded),
we view the present facts as being more in the
nature of permissive use."
In that case, the decision was that the payment of Sl0.00 a
week by a friend for the use of the car for three weeks while
the insured was gone did not constitute a "r.:c·nting".

Other

decisions to the same effect are cited at 7

~ppleman

Law and Practice, 453 Section 4436 (1962).

Similarly, the

Insurance

instant case is one of permissive use and not a "commercial
rental for profit" .
.Uso, in Thompson v. E::::ell, 379 P.2d 983 (Wash. 1963)
the Washington court dealt with an exclusionary clause reading:
Excluding any operation or flight for which a
charge is made (share expense flights shall not
be considered as being made for a charge), dual
or solo instruction (except instruction to the
named assured) and rental to others.
Ezzell was the insured.

He and his wife and four

Thompsons went on a trip for which it was estimated that about
$400.00 as rental would have to be paid to the flight club
owned the airplane.

This included the cost of fuel.

whi~

It was

agreed Thompson would contribute $375. 00 to expenses which wouL
include plane rental.

The court affirmed a summary judgment

against the insurer, holding the contribution by Thompson was a
sharing of the expense, not the payment of a charge.

The court

stated:
It is obvious that both a charge and share the
expense result in the flow of some mo~et~ry consideration to the recipient; yet one is insured
under the policy of insurance while the other is
excluded . . . . While undertaking to interpret
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the provisions of the policy, it is incumbent
upon us to observe the maxims of construction
hereinbefore referred to; e.g. the construction
most favorable to the insured must be apnlied . .
Thus the distinction seems to be that in' a flight
made for a char e the char e rovides the im etus
or motivation for t e £11 ht; e. . ro it; while '
~ s are e~pense
11g t in icates a community
interest in the flight, that is a common desire
to make a particular flight.
In applying Thompson to the case at bar, C. W. Silver
Company's payment of expenses was not a charge which "motivated
the flight".

Furthermore, Sileo Corporation received no profit.

As such no "charge" or "remuneration" was realized so as to exelude Lynn Silver from coverage under Eagle Star's Hull and
Aircraft Liability Policy.
Additionally, in Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance
Company v. Ivens, 338 F.Zd 452 (5th Cir. 1964), an exclusionary
clause for "an operation for which a charge is made" was also
involved.

One Ulsch agreed to pay $10.00 an hour toward the

cost of gasoline used on a six hour flight.

Charter rates for

the use of such a plane would be $38.00 per hour when chartered
with a pilot.

The court found that the $60.00 paid by Ulsch

toward the cost of the gasoline was not a charge within the
meaning of the policy, and therefore held the insurance company
could not deny coverage under their policy.
The only aviation case appellant cites which found a
"charge" to have been made within the meaning of the exclusionary
clause of their insurance policy was in the case of Pacific
Indemnity Company v. Accell Delivery Service, Inc., 485 F.Zd
1169 (5th Cir. 1973), and in that case, the assessment for the
-11-
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use of the airplane was $10. 00 "over and above" the cost of fu,
and storage.

Thus, it was clearly a rental for profit and the

cou"t so found.
Appellant's contention that the word "any" in some

way

enlarges or changes the meaning of the word "remuneration" is
not well taken.

As noted in the Cammack case, coverage was

excluded for "any operation for which a charge is made," but
the court did not find that the "operation" of the aircraft in
question for $10.00 per hour was an "operation" for which a
charge was made, even though the direct operating cost of the
aircraft was $ 7. 25 per hour.

The word "any" does not impart

any special meaning to the words "operation", "charge" or
"remuneration".

It merely includes them, when they are other-

wise found to be present.
is remuneration?

The question still remains -- What

And the authorities as noted herein have

consistently held that it means receiving compensation over ano
above expenses to the extent that a profit motive is involved.
Whether or not the payment of expenses in the
case would satisfy the Guest Statute is immaterial.

insta~

That

statute was designed to meet a different, specific social pro~
lem and has no relevance to the facts of this case.

In the

instant case, the payment of expenses was not made by the
passengers to the pilot, they were paid by the Corporation whic
employed both the pilot and the other male passenger.
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POINT II.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERM "REMUNERATION"
SHOULD BE IN FAVOR OF COVERAGE
Respondents submit that the authorities cited under
Point I above quite clearly indicate that the term "remuneration"
means compensation which results in a net gain or profit to the
one receiving it, as contrasted to merely the paying of expenses,
but if there is any ambiguity in the term as used in the policy
language in question, such ambiguity should be resolved in favor
of a construction which provides for the coverage anticipated by
the insured when the insurance was purchased.
The rule applicable to contracts generally, a fortiori,
insurance contracts is that doubtful language will be construed
most strongly against the party who selected it.

As stated in

17 AM JUR Zd, Contracts, Section 276:
It is fundamental that doubtful language in a
contract should be interpreted most strongly
against the party who has selected that language,
especially where he seeks to use such language
to defeat the contract or its operation, unless
the use of such language in the contract is
prescribed by law. Also, in the case of doubt
or ambiguity a contract will be construed most
strongly against the party who drew it or pre:
pared it, or whose attorney drew or prepared it.
Another form in which substantially the same rule
is stated is that where doubt exists as to the
construction of an instrument prepared by one
party thereto or his attorney, upon the f~ith_of
which the other party has incurred a~ obl~gation,
that construction will be adopted which will be
favorable to the latter. This rule finds its
most frequent application in the case of insurance
policies."
and, as stated in 43 AM JUR Zd, Insurance, Section 271:
The rule of applying the popular meaning to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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insurance policy which are ambiguous, equivocal
or uncertain as to the extent that the intentio~
of the parties is not clear and cannot be ascertained clearly by ~he application of the ordinary
rules of construction are to be construed strictly
and most strongly against the insurer, and liberal~
in favor of the insured, so as to effect the dominant purpose. of indemnity or payment to the insured.
(Authority cited)
This rule has long been recognized in Utah. In Richards v.
Standard Accident Insurance Company, 58 Utah 622, 200 Pac. 101"
(1921) the Utah Supreme Court in holding that sunstroke, althm
scientifically a disease, is popularly ;.mderstood as an accidet
and death resulting therefrom would come within the term of
bodily injury by accidental means stated:
The rule of applying the popular meaning to
words found in insurance policies is doubly
strengthened when the additional rules is
invoked that insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and
their beneficiaries so as to promote and not
defeat the purpose of insurance.
This rule was specifically followed in Moutzoukos v. Mutual
Benefit Health and Accident Association, 69 Utah 309, 254 Pac.
1005, (1927) and in Gibson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States, 84 Utah 452, 36 P.2d 105, (1934).
Although these cases are "old" cases, it is submitted that the
courts generally have continued this liberal interpretation to
the present time.
In the instant case, if the deceased, Lynn Richards
Silver, the general manager of Both Sileo Corporation and C. W.
Silver Company, had not thought that his use of the aircraft by
C. W. Silver Company was covered under Eagle Star's aircraft
policy, such insurance would not have been listed in the sche~
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of underlying insurance in American Casualty's policy.
Another principal of insurance law is that exclusionary
clauses are strictly construed in favor of coverage.

See

Aschenbrenner v. U.S.F.&G. ,292 U.S. 80 (1934); New York Life v.
Benyon, 158 F.2d 260 (10th

Cir.~Utah

1946) and Pearl Assurance

Company v. School District No. 1, 212 F.2d 778 (10th

Cir.~Colo.,

1954).
Also, it is recognized that the insurer has the burden
of proving that an exclusionary clause of a policy is applicable.
Hassing v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 108 Utah
198, 159 P.2d 117 (1945).
Although, the language in question, "operating the
aircraft under the terms of any agreement which provides any
remuneration for use of said aircraft" does not appear in the
Exclusions portion of the policy, it is in effect an exclusion
to "persons insured" under the Insuring Agreements portion of
the policy, and since it excludes persons who would otherwise
be additional insureds (since they are using the aircraft with
the permission of the Named Insured), the language in question
is of an exclusionary nature and the same rule should apply,
i.e., that Eagle Star has the burden of proving not only the
meaning of the clause if it is questionable, but that it is
applicable under the facts of the case.
All of the foregoing rules of construction are applicable in this action since one of the plaintiffs is the
administrator of the estate of the deceased pilot, Lynn Richards
-15-
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Silver, who is an "insured" under defendant's aircraft policy,
if the aircraft was not being operated for remuneration at t~
time of the accident.

Said estate is a real party in interest

to this declaratorv judgment action since if it is determined
that there is no coverage under defendant's aircraft policy, ti
estate will be personally liable for the first Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000.00) of claims arising out of the accident in
question, that amount being the retained limit of American
Casualty's umbrella policy.
POINT III
EAGLE STAR'S POLICY IS SPECIFIC INSURANCE
PRIMARY COVERAGE FOR THE CLAIMS
MADE AGAINST THE ESTATE OF LYNN RICHARDS SILVER.
A:'JD AFFORDS

Utah follows the general rule that a policy writtent
cover a specific vehicle is primary as to any other liability
insurance which may also afford coverage of the incident
ing the vehicle.

In National Farmer's Union Property and

inw~
Cas~

Company v. Farmer's Insurance Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377 P.2d
786 (1963), the defendant company insured the automobile invok
in an accident and the plaintiff company insured the non-owner
driver who had been using the automobile.

The defendant

co~~

refused to defend a negligence suit filed against the non-owner
driver.

The plaintiff company successfully defended the suit

and then brought action for defense costs against defendant
company.

This Court stated:

With regard to whether or not plaintiff is
entitled to recover from defendant, by way of
subrogation, the attorney's fees and court costs,
the better reasoned cases would seem to support
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pla~nt~ff's

position. Both policies obligated
plaintiff and defendant to defend the action
brought by Wolfe. However, the defendant, being
the primary insurance carrier, was the insurer
ultimately liable.to pay a judgment against Morgan,
had one been obtained, and therefore was obligated
to defend him in the first instance.
Also in Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d 157, 417 P.2d
658 (1966) it was held that if two insurance policies cover a
loss and one has a pro rata clause as to other collectible insurance and the other policy has an excess clause with respect
to other collectible insurance, that the pro rata policy is
considered primary coverage and the excess policy is considered
an excess coverage only.

It would seem, a fortiori, that where

appellant's policy contains neither a pro rata or an excess
cov2rag8 clause with respect to other insurance and respondent's
policy is an excess coverage policy with respect to other insurance that is listed in its schedule of underlying insurance,
appellant's policy should be deemed primary and respondent's
policy should be deemed excess coverage only, as it is written.
This Court has also considered the situation where
one insurance policy provides specific coverage and another insurance policy provides blanket coverage which would also cover
the same loss as the specific policy.

In Prudential Federal v.

St. Paul, 20 Utah 2d 95, 433 P.2d 602 (1967) this Court stated:
The rule having wide acceptability pro~i~es t~a~ .
where a blanket policy contains a provision limiting
its liability to excess over speci~ic insuran~e? the
blanket policy must respond, only if the specific
fails to satisfy the loss.
This is exactly the situation in the case at bar.
-17-
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American Casualty's blanket umbrella policy admittedly covers
the loss in question, but what said policy contains is excess
to the underlying insurance listed for each specific risk.
Eagle Star's policy specifically covers the aircraft in
question.

SUMMARY
The sole question in this declaratory judgment

acti~

is whether or not the aircraft in question was being operated
under the terms of any agreement which provides any "remunerati1
for use of said aircraft at the time of the accident in questior
If it was not being so operated, then Eagle Star's aircraft
policy provides primary coverage and American Casualty's policy
provides only excess coverage in excess of Eagle Star's One
Million Dollar limit and the insured's Ten Thousand Dollars
retained limit.
The record is clear that C. W. Silver Company never
paid compensation to Sileo Corporation for use of the aircraft,
other than paying the maintenance and operational expenses
incurred in using the aircraft.

Under the authorities cited hu

in, such payment of maintenance and operational expenses does•
constitute "remuneration" for use of the aircraft so as to remor
the deceased pilot, Lynn Richards Silver, from the definition~
persons insured under appellant's aircraft policy at the time
of the accident in question.
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If under the undisputed facts of this case, there is
any question as to whether or not such facts constitute "aperating the aircraft under the terms of any agreement which
provides any remuneration for use of said aircraft" and the
court is not clearly convinced that they do, then construction
of the exclusionary clause quoted should be resolved in favor of
the respondents, since one of the respondents, the Estate of
Lynn Richards Silver is an otherwise "insured" under the terms
of appellant's aircraft policy and has a personal interest in
said action due to the fact that if there is no coverage under
appellant's aircraft policy, then said Estate is personally
liable for the first Ten Thousand Dollars of claims made against
it under the retained limit of respondent's umbrella clause.
WHEREFORE, respondents pray that this Court affirm the
judgment of the trial court and award respondents their costs
incurred.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of March, 1977.
HANSON, WADSWORTH

&RUSSON
~~
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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